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Abstract
Background: The threat posed by the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) within the
United States has grown significantly in recent years, focusing attention on the medical and public
health disaster capabilities of the nation in a large scale crisis. While the hundreds of thousands or
millions of casualties resulting from a nuclear weapon would, in and of itself, overwhelm our
current medical response capabilities, the response dilemma is further exacerbated in that these
resources themselves would be significantly at risk. There are many limitations on the resources
needed for mass casualty management, such as access to sufficient hospital beds including
specialized beds for burn victims, respiration and supportive therapy, pharmaceutical intervention,
and mass decontamination.
Results: The effects of 20 kiloton and 550 kiloton nuclear detonations on high priority target cities
are presented for New York City, Chicago, Washington D.C. and Atlanta. Thermal, blast and
radiation effects are described, and affected populations are calculated using 2000 block level
census data. Weapons of 100 Kts and up are primarily incendiary or radiation weapons, able to
cause burns and start fires at distances greater than they can significantly damage buildings, and to
poison populations through radiation injuries well downwind in the case of surface detonations.
With weapons below 100 Kts, blast effects tend to be stronger than primary thermal effects from
surface bursts. From the point of view of medical casualty treatment and administrative response,
there is an ominous pattern where these fatalities and casualties geographically fall in relation to
the location of hospital and administrative facilities. It is demonstrated that a staggering number of
the main hospitals, trauma centers, and other medical assets are likely to be in the fatality plume,
rendering them essentially inoperable in a crisis.
Conclusion: Among the consequences of this outcome would be the probable loss of command-
and-control, mass casualties that will have to be treated in an unorganized response by hospitals
on the periphery, as well as other expected chaotic outcomes from inadequate administration in a
crisis. Vigorous, creative, and accelerated training and coordination among the federal agencies
tasked for WMD response, military resources, academic institutions, and local responders will be
critical for large-scale WMD events involving mass casualties.
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Background
The increasing likelihood of the use of weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) on large civilian populations has
been described in international government alerts [1],
U.S. Congressional hearings [2], research studies [3,4],
and numerous scientific publications [5-9]. Islamic terror-
ist attacks on New York and Washington, D.C. have accen-
tuated the reality of this threat, though the magnitude of
casualties with WMD would be many times greater in
scale. There is continued concern over the security of the
enormous arsenal of nuclear, chemical, and biological
agents left over in Russia as a result of the Cold War. It is
known that Libya, Iran, Syria, Iraq, and North Korea have
been actively recruiting the scientists that constructed this
massive stockpile, and it is not certain where many of
these experts are now [10].
While thousands of deaths occurred in a single day with
the World Trade Center attack in New York, the impact on
the health care system was not equivalently severe, as rel-
atively few morbidity cases were produced. In most con-
ceivable WMD attacks, however, it is reasonable to expect
that the health care system would be overloaded with
massive numbers of patients requiring an array of profes-
sionals with specialized training. If this already stretched
medical community was also severely impacted by the
very attack that requires its response, the effects would be
even more devastating. In addition to the loss of medical
care, among the anticipated outcomes for the general pub-
lic will be fear of invisible agents and contagion, magical
thinking about radiation, anger at perceived inadequacies
by government entities, scapegoating, paranoia, social
isolation, demoralization, and loss of faith in social insti-
tutions [11]. Intervention, guided by the appropriate use
of WMD modeling software, would be the fastest and per-
haps even the only effective means to effectively respond
before loss of the sense of social and group responsibili-
ties occurs, and before sufficient decline in the ideological
metaphors which bind the community results in mass
chaos and highly negative social sequelae.
Integration of casualty estimates into current WMD 
response paradigms
Model estimates of casualty distributions could be of great
benefit in mass casualty planning when utilized by the
existing WMD response systems, though development of
these approaches toward the extreme conditions of a
nuclear attack are still underway. This process has
advanced through a number of stages, with the magnitude
of the response necessary for nuclear attack requiring
extensive revisions. An early approach to linking first-
responder, public health, and health care systems by the
U.S. government was the Metropolitan Medical Response
System (MMRS, originally known as Strike Teams) [12].
There were over 50 urban areas that developed MMRSs,
which focus primarily on the training and coordination of
local personnel within target communities.
Another initial approach was the upgrading of civilian
first responders in 120 communities by the U.S. Army Sol-
dier and Biological Chemical Command (SBCCOM). The
Department of Justice's National Domestic Preparedness
Office (NDPO), now part of the Department of Home-
land Security (DHS), is currently processing information
pertaining to law enforcement, emergency medical
response, medical, and public health issues [13]. While
there are various private efforts at planning a mass casu-
alty response, the absence of a large-scale WMD experi-
ence has precluded validation of these efforts. Recently,
the military has developed field deployable emergency
response units, which could prove highly valuable in a
WMD crisis if model predictions could target where they
should be deployed. Health hazard surveillance, control,
and the mitigation of effects in WMD incidents by mobile
response units would be significantly enhanced by the
availability of accurate mass casualty estimates by these
kinds of model efforts. Deployment of these resources in
a large scale crisis like nuclear detonation would be signif-
icantly enhanced by knowledge of the location of burn,
trauma, and other casualties.
Mass casualty estimation on a geographic basis
The Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) has
expended considerable effort to develop models for calcu-
lating mass casualties from a nuclear detonation. In order
to specifically evaluate urban medical systems vulnerabil-
ity we are employing the PC based Consequence Assess-
ment Tool Set (CATS) v6, with ESRI's ArcGIS9 [14], CATS/
JACE (Joint Assessment of Catastrophic Events) v5 with
ESRI's ArcView 3.3, Hazard Prediction and Assessment
Capability (HPAC) V4.04SP3 [15], as well as custom GIS
and database software applications. HPAC does excellent
Chemical Biological and Nuclear (CBN) modeling,
although output could provide more flexibility. Addition-
ally, results can be exported to CATS for further analysis
and display. All three programs can access the current
weather data from both classified and unclassified
weather servers. Examples of uses of CATS/HPAC are hur-
ricane, tidal surge and earthquake damage, prediction of
the results from nuclear, biological and chemical releases,
assessment of persons and infrastructure affected and at
risk (e.g. which hospitals and pharmacies are under a CBN
plume and are thus out of commission), and mobiliza-
tion of surviving and nearby infrastructure outside the
plume that would be needed to address healthcare and
other emergency response needs of the community.
These models have been, and continue to be, developed
with a view to better estimating the impact of WMD weap-
ons in an offensive setting. However, recent DTRAInternational Journal of Health Geographics 2007, 6:5 http://www.ij-healthgeographics.com/content/6/1/5
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enhancements and our modifications have facilitated
their use in helping estimate potential casualties from a
WMD terrorist incident. One area of intense interest, and
somewhat of a vacuum in public health planning, has
been the utility of this approach in estimating medical
care vulnerabilities in such an attack, and for the calcula-
tion of the distribution of surviving medical care
resources. While much work has already occurred in esti-
mating the impact of chemical weapons (due to the dual
use in chemical spill management from transportation
and industrial accidents), or in nuclear power plant acci-
dent management, much less research and development
has gone into estimating the impact on our civilian popu-
lation of a nuclear weapon detonation from a terrorist
incident in a large urban area. The models already calcu-
late such factors as the impact of blast, thermal effects and
fallout, but results are often not available at the detail
level needed for civil defense purposes, casualty manage-
ment, and planning the use of scarce health resources in
response to a nuclear weapon detonation. Furthermore,
the models do not readily facilitate the calculation of inju-
ries from multiple effects such as burns and blast with fall-
out or prompt radiation. The complexity of the urban
three-dimensional landscape and its local impact on ther-
mal, blast and radiation is also poorly understood. Addi-
tionally, given their traditional world-wide focus, and the
increased sensitivity to providing information on the
U.S.A. of use to terrorists, the models do not provide
detailed or current data that exists for the United States
that would help provide better casualty estimates and
response. The models can be customized locally and data
updated if the user has sufficient expertise. However, there
is often a significant duplication of effort due to overlap-
ping jurisdictions and the lack of data sharing due to secu-
rity and other considerations.
CATS and HPAC are also useful for creating realistic sce-
narios for training and planning before a disaster strikes,
thus enabling responders to drill and exercise so they
know roughly what to expect and how to react. Contin-
gency plans can be created using comprehensive national
and more detailed population and infrastructure data.
Should disaster strike, the affected population and the
impact on critical facilities can be quickly assessed,
although efforts frequently need to be expended to ensure
regional and local databases are current and useful.
Utilization of model casualty estimates in medical 
planning
Without the directed use of accurate casualty distribution
estimates, it is likely that past failures in mass casualty
planning in large-scale medical disasters will be repeated.
During the Sarin attack on Tokyo, hospitals became part
of the problem when 23% of the healthcare workers
became ill by unintentionally spreading the nerve agent to
hospital and emergency staff workers. During the SARS
epidemic in China, hospitals in Beijing and Hong Kong
became "Super Seeders" of the cornavirus and dramatically
accelerated contagion up to 250 individuals per day. A
study by the American College of Emergency Physicians
(ACEP) Task Force found that "little or no WMD-based
expertise" existed among medical staff workers in hospi-
tals [16].
Based on information from the National Commission on
Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (9–11 Commis-
sion)[17], public hearings on the initial response show a
terrible confusion among first responders that resulted in
the addition of a "Catastrophic Incident Annex" to the sec-
ond draft version of the National Response Plan (NRP)
[18]. First responders during 9/11 suffered from an inabil-
ity to communicate information concerning the scale and
magnitude of the disaster, and thereby released conflict-
ing public service information during the crisis that
resulted in additional loss of life. The findings of these
hearings show a critical need for a "National Strategy" for
medical response to catastrophic incidents. The require-
ments of the Catastrophic Incident Annex exceed the CDC
and HRSA benchmarks of 500 hospital beds for a popula-
tion of one million needed for natural disasters.
For an effective response, delineating the geographic
zones in which different types of injuries are likely to be
found, and delineating zones in which victims are likely
to sustain multiple injuries, is critical. In the case of a
nuclear explosion, thermal effects will produce very large
numbers of burn casualties – a dramatic medical and
security challenge that differs from routine medical emer-
gencies or non-nuclear WMD events. Multiple trauma
injuries will accompany the injuries inflicted by thermal
radiation. These will be qualitatively similar to current
trauma protocols, with the exception of fallout contami-
nation, but will differ drastically on the quantitative level.
Additionally, certain regions will experience the unique
casualties from prompt and fallout radiation. Multiple
effects make for sicker patients, slower recoveries, and
greater danger of severe sickness or death, especially
among the old, the young, and the infirm.
A future goal for this work will be to focus on identifying
those geographic areas and those combinations of casual-
ties for which scarce medical resources can do the most
good in the early stages of a disaster. This will help com-
manders determine where, among the harder hit areas,
they should turn their attention as more resources come
to bear. Currently, casualty management modeling and
resource estimation support tools such as NBC CREST
[19] exist for the military, but much work needs to be
done to modify them from a military focus and make
them useful in a civil defense environment. Work alsoInternational Journal of Health Geographics 2007, 6:5 http://www.ij-healthgeographics.com/content/6/1/5
Page 4 of 33
(page number not for citation purposes)
needs to be done on identifying zones of different types of
multiple injuries and estimating the impact of a fleeing
population on casualties requiring treatment in various
zones.
Use of model estimations to help address limitations in 
mass casualty resources
Once accurate model estimations of mass casualty distri-
butions are available, this data could be invaluable in the
distribution of limited medical response resources in a
WMD crisis in order to minimize mortality and morbidity
in mass casualties. Although the National Disaster Medi-
cal System has voluntary access to 100,000 hospital beds
nationwide, getting patients to these widely dispersed
beds in time would be a logistical nightmare in nuclear as
well as other WMD scenarios. A particularly dangerous
deficiency is the lack of equipment for patient respiration
and supportive therapy nationwide [20]. In a crisis in
which there are tens of thousands of victims requiring res-
pirators, there is certainly a potential for most of the more
critical cases to perish. An ironic feature of the recent ter-
rorist attacks in New York was the lack of impact on the
health care system there, since most of the victims in the
World Trade Center collapse died, without producing
large numbers of ancillary casualties. However, nuclear
detonation, as well as most WMD attacks, would be
expected to produce the need for large mass casualty
resources, including respirators. A national pharmaceuti-
cal stockpile has been created by the Centers for Disease
Control to provide large supplies of many of the pharma-
ceutical agents that we would expect to need in likely
WMD attack scenarios [21]. Arrangements are in place to
use commercial carriers to speed elements of the stockpile
to the various locations in which the attacks occur. Selec-
tion of the locations to place these critical distribution
points would be considerably expedited by accurate pre-
dictions of where the casualties that critically need them
would most likely be located.
Data and methods
Study area
Four of the top ten sized cities (New York City, Chicago,
Washington, D.C. and Atlanta) were selected for this
study of the impact of downtown nuclear detonations on
populations and health care systems. All four cities are
considered potentially high risk cities for a terrorist event.
Size of weapon
Two sizes of nuclear weapon were simulated. The explo-
sion of a tactical nuclear weapon with a predicted yield of
20 kilotons (Kt) and the explosion of the most common
size of strategic weapon in the Russian arsenal with a 550
Kt yield. A fission fraction of 1 was assumed for the
smaller device and 0.8 was assumed for the 550 Kt device
[22]. Both weapons were assumed to explode close to the
ground surface, as in a truck or a ship. Bursts at higher lev-
els would cause greater thermal and blast effects which
would be somewhat offset by lower downwind radiation
amounts.
Affected population
Population calculations were based upon block level data
from the 2000 census, so calculations are based upon
night time population data. In downtown areas, daytime
populations, and therefore casualties, would be higher.
Secondary deaths from radioactive fallout and other
effects of the blasts would greatly increase the immediate
deaths. Daytime building population estimates are rarely
available but can be very high. Some examples of daytime
populations for individual buildings are: Illinois Center
in Chicago – 40,000; Empire State Building, New York –
20,000; former World Trade Center Complex – 50,000
employees with up to 100,000 visitors daily. The total
nighttime population in Manhattan is roughly 1.5 million
rising to 2.1 million with workers during a typical day. To
this number must be added visitors for special events and
tourists, a number that is highly variable, and for which
no official estimates exist [23]. For Washington, D.C.
Homeland Security Council (HSC) [24] quotes Oak Ridge
National Laboratory's (ORNL) estimate of the daytime
population at 1,066,666 and the nighttime population at
571,476, yielding 495,190 additional people during the
day. HSC estimated an additional 701,000 people by day
within 11 kilometers (kms) of downtown Washington of
which 481,000 were within a 5 km radius of downtown,
and an additional 220,000 were distributed in a donut
shape with an outer radius of 11 kms and an inner radius
of 5 kms. In the absence of building level data, the
National Planning Scenarios suggest a better estimate of
daytime population for Washington can be obtained by
adding an additional 6124 people per square km to the 5
km central part of Washington and 579 people per square
km to the 5–11 km ring, [24]. In the case of Manhattan,
spreading the additional 600,000 daytime population
evenly adds an additional 7,059 per square km during
daytime, giving a better approximation of 24,706 per
square km for the daytime population without visitors.
Hospital data
Data on the number and types of hospital beds were
obtained from DTRA's CATS/JACE database and updated
from ESRI's 2004 Data and Maps [25] and InfoSource's
American Directory of Hospitals 2004 [26]. Psychiatric
and other special hospitals were removed from consider-
ation. Some discrepancies were fixed using the American
Hospital Directory [27].
Weather and climate data
Weather and climate has a significant effect on impacts
resulting from a nuclear detonation [28]. Wind is oneInternational Journal of Health Geographics 2007, 6:5 http://www.ij-healthgeographics.com/content/6/1/5
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major factor, as wind carries the resultant fallout cloud
downwind. Atmospheric stability affects the height of the
typical mushroom cloud and behavior of the fallout
plume, and the amount, thickness and height of clouds
impact the scattering, reflection and absorption of radia-
tion. Detonations occurring below clouds have a much
greater impact on thermal radiation as radiation is
reflected back down to earth, while detonations above
cloud reflect radiation out to space and reduce radiation
at the surface. Snow also enhances the effect of thermal
radiation through its high albedo. Snow and cloud
together typically increase the impact of thermal radiation
roughly twofold, but in extreme situations, with high vis-
ibility beneath dense clouds, there can be up to five times
the radiation of a clear day [29].
Average upper air climate for a month or season does not
estimate nuclear effects well, as averaging a north and
south wind could cancel each other out. What is needed is
a synoptic climatology of typical upper air conditions for
major cities. These data are currently not available, so for
this study we selected a number of case studies from
upper-air radiosonde data for particular days, and we have
used these weather conditions as model inputs. The data
were selected after looking at three years of twice daily
skew-T Log P thermodynamic diagrams from the Ply-
mouth State University's meteorology program WEB site
to get a better understanding for the data [30]. The days
we have selected are significant days when winds gener-
ally ran in a direction with major impact on the health
care system. However, these days are not isolated, as sim-
ilar patterns were seen to repeat on many other days.
When analyzing data for civil defense purposes it is criti-
cally important not to underestimate the potential
impacts of the catastrophe being analyzed. For our
selected case studies, data was input on pressure, altitude,
temperature, wind speed, wind direction and humidity
for several levels up to the 300 millibar level or about
9,000 meters (m).
Model used and sources of uncertainty
We used the DTRA's CATS-JACE model to simulate the
effect of fallout radiation from a nuclear explosion [31],
EM-1 to calculate blast effects [32], and Brode's work [33],
as modified by Binninger [34] to calculate thermal flu-
ence, using thermal fractions as discussed in Northop
[35]. With any such models there are many sources of
uncertainty in the input parameters which can be expected
to impact the accuracy of the predictions.
Atmospheric effects
As noted above, atmospheric conditions affect the quan-
tity of energy absorbed, reflected and scattered, with a
highly significant impact on casualty distributions. Near
surface bursts create craters and large amounts of dust and
solids from the ground, or buildings are thrown into the
air. Low cloud above the fireball will cause a considerable
degree of reflection back to the surface which will reflect
from many different angles and considerably increase the
impact of thermal radiation and favor mass fires. Fresh
snow on the ground would also reflect the radiation, fur-
ther increasing the thermal impact.
Wind speed and direction have a tremendous impact on
where fallout radiation is deposited. This depends upon
many factors, from the overall synoptic situation and
topography to local turbulence and surface roughness,
land use, and street width and orientation. Models give
better results when current three dimensional weather
data are utilized as input, along with detailed topography
and land use. However, generally speaking, much further
work needs to be done before dispersion models can pro-
vide detailed, realistic results in complex city centers.
Observers have noted large changes in radiation fallout
over small distances caused by variations in local atmos-
pheric conditions and topography [36].
Protection offered by buildings and vehicles
Buildings provide various degrees of protection from radi-
ation according to the type of construction and location.
The level of protection offered typically varies between
10% and 80%. Some of the factors which affect protection
include whether the building is in an urban or rural area,
the roof and wall type and thickness, number of floors
and location of office or home relative to other floors, e.g.,
single story, multistory, basement, top floors, middle
floors and lower floors and whether glass is shattered by
blast [37,38]. Blast damage greatly reduces the protection
factors through the blowing in of doors, loss of roof integ-
rity, and breaking of windows. At Hiroshima, windows
were broken at a radius of 15 kms by overpressures of only
a fraction of a pound per square inch and in exceptional
cases were broken up to 27 kms away [38]. Using typical
figures from Hiroshima and the cube law for blast extrap-
olation, one could expect windows to break at up to 17.5
kms for 20 Kt and 53 kms for 550 Kt detonations. Injury
thresholds for window glass are considered to be about
0.6 pounds per square inch (psi) [26] or 6 kms for 20 Kt
and 18 kms for 550 Kt detonations from fig 2.29 [34].
Recent research [39-41] has shown that buildings, even in
their best condition, fail to provide good filtration from
radioactive particles in the 1–10 micron range, where the
greatest health threat exists.
The highest impacts of radiation generally occur when
people are caught in the open, or, are tied up in traffic
jams trying to escape in vehicles, which provide little pro-
tection against fallout. Based on evidence from recent nat-
ural disasters in Louisiana and Florida it is likely that
major exit arteries after a nuclear event will be completelyInternational Journal of Health Geographics 2007, 6:5 http://www.ij-healthgeographics.com/content/6/1/5
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impassable during the time period when fallout is at a
maximum, exposing fleeing population to high levels of
fallout. It is also expected that due to lack of information
getting to the public, many people will try to flee by car or
on foot, often in the wrong direction, again exposing
themselves to high levels of radiation, as vehicles provide
virtually no protection. Shelter-in-place options are
poorly understood, and without effective communica-
tions and well thought out and prepared plans by both
authorities and potential victims, could prove equally dis-
astrous.
Buildings also protect against thermal effects by blocking
a direct line of sight to the detonation. Thermal effects
may be affected by such factors as the number, size and
orientation of windows; presence or absence of intact
windows after the blast; size, number of panes and tinting
of glass, presence or absence of bug screens, and height,
spacing and orientation of buildings. Window coverings
and type of furniture and furnishings will respond differ-
ently to the increased thermal surge, with some materials
being more susceptible to burning than others.
Discussion and results
Effects of nuclear weapon detonations
Thermal effects – fires and burns
The thermal impacts of a nuclear explosion are always
large but scale much faster than blast with larger yield det-
onations. Thermal radiation decays as the inverse square
of the distance from the detonation, while blast decays as
the inverse cube of the distance. Figure 1[42] shows the
blast and thermal effects from a low free air burst for a 12
Kt (Hiroshima size) and a 500 Kt typical Russian warhead
It shows the much larger rate of increase of the thermal
component compared to the blast component in going
from the 12 Kt to the 500 Kt devices. A similar effect for 20
and 550 kiloton devices is shown in Figures 2a through
2d, using Atlanta as an illustration. For large weapon sizes
(> 100 Kt), significant thermal effects extend to much
greater radii than substantial blast effects.
Absorption of thermal energy can cause fires in the vicin-
ity of the detonation point and burns to individuals,
either directly from flash burns or indirectly from the
mass fires themselves. Binninger et al [34] have conducted
work for DTRA on fire prediction modeling. In urban
environments, a large number of variables can affect the
intensity and impact of the thermal pulse. These include
the weapon yield, the fraction of the total yield emitted as
thermal radiation, the distance between the weapon and
point of interest, and the thermal radiation transmissivity
through the immediate atmosphere. EM-1 [32], Brode
[33], Binninger [34], Northop [35] and Glasstone [37]
have all calculated the thermal fluence for any point at a
distance from ground zero, and we have used Brode's
method, as modified in Binninger.
Clouds and the presence of snow have a major impact,
and, as noted above, if the fireball occurs below thick con-
tinuous cloud, a five-fold increase in reflection may occur.
Recent snow cover further increases effects, although the
study of cloud and snow interaction is a subject for further
research. Cloud height, thickness, type, atmospheric scat-
tering, dust particles in the air, humidity, building orien-
tation and size and location of windows, all have effects,
as do type and quantity of flammable materials that will
be illuminated within a room. Building construction also
plays a major role in room to room and floor to floor
spread, as do separation and orientation of neighboring
distances [42].
In general, fire effects of nuclear weapons are not as well
developed as the modeling of blast and target destruction,
yet it is recognized that casualties resulting from fires, and
burns in nuclear attack would be of major impact for civil
defense [43] and emergency health care. Major fires can
occur when thermal fluences exceed 10 calories (cals)/cm2
and are very common with fluences over 25 cals/cm2,
although this varies with the type of construction, build-
ing contents, and morphology of the city [34,43]. Fires
will start much easier when windows are blown out as
glass greatly reduces the thermal fluence inside a room.
Skin burns are generally classified into first (like very bad
sunburn), second (produce blisters that lead to infection
if untreated and permanent scars) and third degree burns
(which destroy skin and underlying tissue) and are
dependent upon the intensity of the radiant exposure and
the size of the explosive device (Table 1 from Fig 12.65
[37]). The entire US has specialized facilities to treat
roughly 1,500 burn victims, which is far less than the burn
casualties produced by one single small nuclear explo-
sion. Additionally, most of these beds are already occu-
pied.
The thermal effects listed in tables 2 and 3 refer to block
level Census 2000 or nighttime affected population that
are within the given thermal contour. For populations
within the mass fire contour (13 cals/cm2) very few peo-
ple will escape without some form of significant injury. In
the third degree burn zone there will be many burns from
resulting fires as well as those directly affected by flash
burns from the detonation. For the first and second degree
burn zones, the number of people exposed (i.e. in direct
line of sight to the fireball) will vary greatly by time of day,
time of year, weather, city and building morphology.
Weather factors such as cloud above the fireball and snow
on the ground will aid in multiple and omni-directional
reflection of radiation and greatly increase the numbers
and average intensity of burns. Typical exposure propor-International Journal of Health Geographics 2007, 6:5 http://www.ij-healthgeographics.com/content/6/1/5
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Peak blast overpressure and total thermal energy as a function of range from detonation for 12 and 500 Kt weapons Figure 1
Peak blast overpressure and total thermal energy as a function of range from detonation for 12 and 500 Kt 
weapons. (A) Range dependence of peak overpressure and thermal energy from a 12 kiloton detonation at a height of burst 
of about 2,000 feet. (B) Similar curves for a 500 kiloton detonation at a height of burst of about 8,000 feet. A comparison of 
the graphs shows that thermal energy scales much faster than peak overpressure. Reprinted with permission from Figure 8 
The Medical Implications of Nuclear War 1986 by the National Academy of Sciences, courtesy of the National Acade-
mies Press, Washington, D.C.International Journal of Health Geographics 2007, 6:5 http://www.ij-healthgeographics.com/content/6/1/5
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Blast, Thermal and Fallout Effects for 20 Kt and 550 Kt Nuclear Explosions in Atlanta Figure 2
Blast, Thermal and Fallout Effects for 20 Kt and 550 Kt Nuclear Explosions in Atlanta. (a) 20 Kt Blast Intensity. 
(b) 550 Kt Blast Intensity. (c) 20 Kt Thermal Intensity, (d) 550 Kt Thermal Intensity. (e) 20 Kt Fallout, (f) 550 Kt Fallout.International Journal of Health Geographics 2007, 6:5 http://www.ij-healthgeographics.com/content/6/1/5
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tions of affected population actually receiving first, sec-
ond or third degree burns will range from 1% to 25% of
those affected [44,45], with the recent National Planning
Scenarios assuming 15% as a reasonable average [[26],
page I-28]. For a spring/early summer day at lunchtime or
on a weekend afternoon, 25% would not be unreasona-
ble.
The areas of New York, Washington, D.C., Chicago and
Atlanta affected by thermal radiation from a 550 KT
nuclear detonation are shown in Figures 3, 4, 5, 6 respec-
tively. The destruction of the major hospitals in the down-
town areas is nearly complete in all four cities. Hydrology
of the urban areas can be a significant factor with the
impact of rivers, lakes, and ocean systems in and adjacent
to the urban areas. In New York (Figure 3), with the divi-
sion of Manhattan from the other city areas by two rivers
emptying into the ocean, the loss of the hospital infra-
structure is alleviated somewhat by the wider geographic
distribution of the health care system (the dense urban
packing of hospitals still intensifies the hospital bed loss).
In Washington D.C. (Figure 4), hospital distribution
occurs primarily north of the Potomac River, further con-
centrating urban health care systems in the areas signifi-
cantly impacted by the severe zones of thermal effect.
Location next to a large body of water, like Chicago adja-
cent to Lake Michigan (Figure 5), tends to dissipate much
of the thermal damage over water when ground zero is in
the downtown area. Inland cities like Atlanta (Figure 6)
do not have these mitigating factors, and hospital distri-
bution follows primarily economic factors.
Blast damage
Most damage to buildings in cities comes from explosive
blast. The blast drives air away from the explosion causing
objects to be crushed and high winds that can knock
objects down, such as people or trees. Four pounds per
square inch (4psi) is usually enough to destroy most resi-
dential dwellings. Most blast deaths occur from the col-
lapse of occupied buildings, or from people being blown
into objects, or objects impacting people. Typically, about
half the people whose low rise buildings collapse on them
survive the collapse.
The areas of New York, Washington, D.C., Chicago, and
Atlanta affected by blast from a 550 Kt nuclear detonation
are shown in Figures 7, 8, 9, 10, respectively. One stagger-
ing factor of the blast damage in Washington is the
extremely high concentration of government buildings
within the blast zones, with higher concentration of
buildings corresponding to a higher degree of blast dam-
age (Figure 7). With the overlap of blast damage with ther-
mal effect zones, there is a similar decrease of blast
damage coverage in New York due to the presence of river
systems as occurred with thermal effects (Figure 8). The
lack of hospitals west of the Hudson River, for instance,
results in a relatively small impact of blast damage on
health care systems in that approximate half of the blast
zone (though the relative lack of access to health care in
this area will only be exacerbated in this crisis). As noted
previously with a 550 kT detonation in Chicago, location
next to a large body of water helps to dissipate the effect
of the blast damage over this unpopulated area (as it did
for thermal effect). Indeed, for the example of this nuclear
attack simulation, ground zero was placed further to the
West in anticipation of this factor (Figure 9). If large-scale
nuclear devices are detonated immediately adjacent to
large water systems in their likely placement in downtown
areas, this will consistently lower blast damage and ther-
mal effects. The example of Atlanta, with the widespread
distribution of government buildings outside the down-
town urban area, demonstrates the disseminated effect in
cities located in interior locations away from significant
water systems (Figure 10). However, there still is a dispro-
portionate effect on health care systems, though not as
distinctive as in the other cities in this study.
Source Region Electro-magnetic Pulse [SREMP]
Electrical and electronic equipment, both plugged-in and
some unplugged, will be severely impacted in areas
affected by Source Region Electro-magnetic Pulse
[SREMP]. SREMP is produced by low-altitude nuclear
bursts and will affect areas from 3–8 km radius from the
detonation point depending upon yield [33], with
National Planning Scenarios assuming 4 kms for a 10 Kt
device. This is roughly the same region likely to be affected
by blast and shock. For hospitals this means power and
any connected backup power sources will be lost, and
Table 1: Intensity of thermal fluence by thermal effect type
Type of Thermal Effect 20 Kt Device Thermal Fluence Calories/cm2 550 Kt Device Thermal Fluence Calories/cm2
Mass Fires Virtually Certain 25 25
Mass Fires Likely 13 13
Mass Fires Possible 10 10
3rd Degree Burns (50% chance) 7.6 9.4
2nd Degree Burns (50% chance) 5.0 6.2
1st Degree Burns (50% chance) 2.5 3.1International Journal of Health Geographics 2007, 6:5 http://www.ij-healthgeographics.com/content/6/1/5
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most equipment connected using a plug to access power
will likely have been destroyed by SREMP. Equipment
that is unplugged may or may not be affected. SREMP
affected areas extend up to the 1psi blast contour for small
blasts (< 20 Kt) and up to somewhere between the 1 and
2psi contours for our 550 Kt example.
The combination of SREMP on electronics, and blast
effects on antenna integrity and alignment will severely
curtail radio, cell phone and satellite communications in
a post event environment [46].
Prompt radiation
Prompt radiation occurs from fission products in the first
second after a nuclear explosion. Significant health effects
extend out to roughly 2 kms for a 20 Kt nuclear detona-
tion and to 3–4 kms for a 550 Kt device, depending upon
the radiation characteristics of the actual device. In gen-
eral, radiation doses closer to ground zero are very high
with a rapid fall off in dose as one proceeds outward.
Within the inner zone near ground zero fatalities are gen-
erally 100% for those exposed in the open, and, even for
those in buildings, mortality will be high except for those
in basements.
Fallout radiation
The conical-shaped plumes of casualties generated by
radioactive fallout account for the largest geographic dis-
tribution of effect from most nuclear weapon detona-
tions. Most of the radioactive particles generated by the
blast will fall within 24 hours on areas extending out from
ground zero in the direction of prevailing winds and is
referred to as early fallout.
From the radioactive fallout, the larger, relatively more
radioactive particles fall out closer to the detonation area
within hours. Known generally as "early fallout" this con-
stitutes by far the greatest hazard to health. Slightly
smaller particles generated by the nuclear blast will
behave like aerosols and are dispersed into the tropo-
sphere where they could stay suspended for months. The
fallout from this portion remains in bands around the
earth at the latitude of the detonation. This portion of the
fallout is often referred to as "late fallout", and is less haz-
ardous than early fallout [47]. Additional fallout pene-
Table 2: Affected populations from 550 Kt surface detonations in 4 downtowns
Effect Type City
Washington New York Chicago Atlanta
Combined Fallout and 
Thermal
2,678,638 6,456,056 3,398,527 1,243,165
Combined Fallout and Blast 2,541,368 6,001,862 3,167,676 1,178,751
All Thermal categories 923,401 3,309,930 1,614,371 459,639
All Fallout categories 2,170,917 5,042,904 2,430,731 1,064,928
All Blast categories 708,710 2,554,308 1,251,965 353,925
All Thermal categories 923,401 3,309,930 1,614,371 459,639
> 25 cal cm2 Zone 211,206 903,591 316,847 122,572
> 13–25 cal cm2 Zone 135,752 521,519 305,725 68,720
3rd Degree Burn Zone 94,202 315,388 190,071 42,141
2nd Degree Burn Zone* 165,557 509,926 256,134 71,496
1st Degree Burn Zone 316,684 1,059,506 545,594 154,710
All Fallout Categories 
where mortality > 0.5%
2,170,917 5,042,904 2,430,731 1,064,928
Mortality > 90% 1,016,206 3,229,502 1,473,337 614,767
> 50–90% 583,486 493,519 261,381 123,160
> 10–50% 311,292 678,783 180,456 119,567
> 0.5–10% 259,933 641,100 515,557 207,568
All Blast categories over 
1psi
708,710 2,554,308 1,251,965 353,925
> 20psi 20,710 158,889 52,950 19,476
10–20psi 32,703 155,019 34,704 25,437
3–10psi 158,287 596,150 231,341 77,985
2–3psi * 138,363 537,279 316,306 71,105
1–2psi 358,647 1,106,971 616,664 159,922
• Approximately 500,000 additional daytime workers will be affected for Washington and 600,000 for New York for the second degree burn zones 
or the 2psi zone. No data are available for Atlanta and Chicago.International Journal of Health Geographics 2007, 6:5 http://www.ij-healthgeographics.com/content/6/1/5
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trates the stratosphere and its particles are deposited
worldwide over a period of months to years [28]. Most of
the radioactive fallout is downwind from the explosion
and up to 70 per cent is in the larger particle portion, or
"early fallout" occurring within hours. One principle of
note is that the intensity of the radioactivity varies
inversely with distance from the site of explosion. With a
steady wind, the pattern of accumulated dose of radioac-
tivity assumes the shape of nested cigar-shaped contours,
each contour denoting a particular dose [48].
In a nuclear explosion, over 400 radioactive isotopes are
released into the biosphere. Among these, about 40 radio
nuclides are considered potentially hazardous [49]. Of
particular interest are those isotopes whose organ specifi-
city and long half-lives present a danger of irreversible
damage or induction of malignant alterations [50,51].
Both early and delayed fallout result in the deposition of
radioactive material in the environment [52]. The annual
average whole-body fallout rate in the United States at the
end of the 20th Century was approximately 45 FSv (4.5
mrem) [53,54].
To consider the relative long-term impact of fallout, a
device about twice the size of the 550 Kt weapon analyzed
in this study (one MT), detonated at ground level with a
steady wind of approximately 15 miles per hour, would
produce a fallout radioactivity dose rate of 400 rem in 24
hours in an area of approximately 400 square miles. At a
dose rate of 2 rem per year, more than 20 times the maxi-
mum recommended by the EPA, an area of 1,200 square
miles would remain unfit for use for a year and more than
20,000 square miles would be uninhabitable for a month
[55].
Several Federal Web sites offer good discussions of nuclear
issues including fallout [56-58]. The Department of
Homeland Security has a number of ongoing initiatives
such as the Radiological and Nuclear Countermeasures
Program to enhance U.S. security against unconventional
attacks. Their summary provides an excellent background
Table 3: Affected population from 20 Kt surface detonation in 4 downtowns
Effect Type City
Washington New York Chicago Atlanta
Combined Fallout and 
Thermal
188,430 1,649,587 614,535 182,717
Combined Fallout and Blast 223,570 1,733,983 637,033 207,025
All Thermal categories 39,641 140,701 79,451 36,256
All Fallout categories 172,819 1,592,968 554,048 160,224
All Blast categories 92,040 286,587 104,988 63,814
All Thermal categories 39,641 140,701 79,451 36,256
> 25 cal cm2 Zone 1,024 12,336 11,574 1,431
> 13–25 cal cm2 Zone 963 15,303 14,685 1,810
3rd Degree Burn Zone* 3,132 20,660 12,456 5,001
2nd Degree Burn Zone** 9,876 22,993 10,381 8,593
1st Degree Burn Zone 24,646 69,409 30355 19,421
All Fallout Categories 
where mortality > 0.5%
172,819 1,592,968 554,048 160,224
Mortality > 90% 80,386 429,172 252,538 46,579
> 50–90% 14,851 145,123 52,182 11,632
> 10–50% 28,335 358,922 85,807 43,970
> 0.5–10% 49,247 661,177 163,521 58,043
All Blast categories over 
1psi
92,040 286,587 104,988 63,814
> 20psi 902 8,616 4,222 961
10–20psi 658 10,056 9,799 1,342
3–10psi 9,194 46,515 33,410 12,949
2–3psi *** 22,532 55,126 23,360 15,278
1–2psi 58,754 166,274 34,197 33,284
To take into account daytime populations near central business districts [26]
* Add roughly 32–35,000 additional people within 3rd degree burn isoline
** Add roughly 53–60,000 additional people within 2nd degree burn isoline
*** Add roughly 50,000 additional people within the 3psi isoline and 90,000 within the 2psi isoline.International Journal of Health Geographics 2007, 6:5 http://www.ij-healthgeographics.com/content/6/1/5
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on where we are today and where we are going, as well as
some useful theory [59]. Should a real event occur, federal
assistance can be provided by specialized teams, such as
the Oak Ridge Institute for Science and Education's
(ORISE) Radiation Emergency Assistance Center (REAC/
TS) [60]. These teams can also provide pre-event nuclear
and radiation training.
The areas of New York, Washington, D.C., Chicago, and
Atlanta affected by fallout and thermal from 550 Kt and
20 Kt nuclear detonations are shown in Figures 11, 12, 13,
14 and Figures 15, 16, 17, 18, respectively. In the case of
New York, the prevailing West to East weather pattern
results in a conical extension of fallout casualties down
the length of Long Island following the 550 kT detonation
in Manhattan (Figure 11). This scenario carries significant
negative impacts on the health care systems distributed
consistently along the length of the island, with 51% of
hospitals and 53% of the medical staff lost within 20
miles of ground zero (Table 4). This is the highest number
of affected hospitals (at 54) in this publication, for all four
cities considered. Even for the smaller 20 Kt weapon in
New York (Figure 15), wind patterns coming inland off of
the ocean result in a devastating loss of the great majority
Thermal Impact of 550 Kt Surface Nuclear Detonation on New York City with Weather as of September 17th, 2004 Figure 3
Thermal Impact of 550 Kt Surface Nuclear Detonation on New York City with Weather as of September 17th, 2004.International Journal of Health Geographics 2007, 6:5 http://www.ij-healthgeographics.com/content/6/1/5
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of health care systems located between the East and Hud-
son Rivers due to the resulting fallout.
The stunning impact of fallout radiation from the 550 Kt
detonation is evident from the loss of the hospital systems
from two major metropolitan areas: the loss of Washing-
ton D.C. health care systems from the thermal and blast
effects and the loss of Baltimore hospitals from the fallout
plume 40 miles away (Figure 12). This resulted in a 48%
loss of hospitals in the 20 mile buffer around the two cit-
ies, a 57% loss of beds, and 67,000 health care workers
directly affected for a total loss of 62% of the workers
(Table 4). In Figure 16, the mass fire zones in Washington
D.C. after a 20 Kt detonation are hardly visible due to the
Thermal Impact of a 550 Kt Surface Nuclear Detonation on Washington, D.C. with Weather as of April 22nd, 2004 Figure 4
Thermal Impact of a 550 Kt Surface Nuclear Detonation on Washington, D.C. with Weather as of April 22nd, 2004.International Journal of Health Geographics 2007, 6:5 http://www.ij-healthgeographics.com/content/6/1/5
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Thermal Impact of a 550 Kt Surface Nuclear Detonation on Chicago with Weather as of March 19th, 2003 Figure 5
Thermal Impact of a 550 Kt Surface Nuclear Detonation on Chicago with Weather as of March 19th, 2003.International Journal of Health Geographics 2007, 6:5 http://www.ij-healthgeographics.com/content/6/1/5
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large number of government buildings in the burned out
areas. Even for this relatively small nuclear device, half of
the hospitals in the immediate vicinity of the city will be
circumscribed by the fallout plume.
Not all fallout plumes will be symmetrical cones in shape,
as demonstrated in Figure 13 in Chicago, with the weather
pattern for that day resulting in a broader, heart-shaped
plume extending from ground zero into the interior
Thermal Impact of a 550 Kt Surface Nuclear Detonation on Atlanta with Weather as of April 23rd, 2004 Figure 6
Thermal Impact of a 550 Kt Surface Nuclear Detonation on Atlanta with Weather as of April 23rd, 2004.International Journal of Health Geographics 2007, 6:5 http://www.ij-healthgeographics.com/content/6/1/5
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beyond Lake Michigan. Such expansions can greatly
increase the impact on health care systems, as indicated by
the 48% loss of hospital beds within 20 miles of the
plume area (Table 4). This is similar to the hospital bed
loss rate for both cities affected by the Washington deto-
nation (Washington D.C. and Baltimore), and considera-
bly higher than the hospital loss rates for New York and
Atlanta. The actual percentage of hospital bed loss also
was higher for Washington D.C. and Chicago than for
New York and Atlanta. Unlike Washington D.C. though,
the smaller 20 Kt detonation did not have the same inclu-
sive effect on hospital loss, with the narrow radiation
Blast Impact of 550 Kt Surface Nuclear Detonation on New York City with Weather as of September 17th, 2004 Figure 7
Blast Impact of 550 Kt Surface Nuclear Detonation on New York City with Weather as of September 17th, 2004.International Journal of Health Geographics 2007, 6:5 http://www.ij-healthgeographics.com/content/6/1/5
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plume in the Chicago example leaving a large number of
unaffected suburban hospitals intact. In this case, the sig-
nificant urban sprawl of America's third largest city has
resulted in a sufficiently widespread distribution of subur-
ban hospitals, resulting in a significant number of hospi-
tals escaping deactivation from the relatively narrow
fallout plume. A similar situation is seen with Atlanta
(Figure 18), where the narrow fallout plume of the smaller
20 Kt device devastates several key urban hospitals, but
many more in the suburban sprawl are apparently spared
contamination resulting in immediate threat to life.
Measuring radiation dosage
Like most drugs or chemicals, there is a relationship
between radiation dose and its effect on the body. Radia-
tion dosing can be thought of as an amount of energy
absorbed by the body. The rad is a unit of absorbed radi-
aton dose defined in terms of the energy actually depos-
ited in the tissue. One rad is an absorbed dose of 0.01
joules of energy per kilogram of tissue. To accurately
assess the risk of radiation, the absorbed dose energy in
rad is multiplied by the relative biological effectiveness
(RBE) of the radiation to get the biological dose equiva-
Blast Impact of a 550 Kt Surface Nuclear Detonation on Washington, D.C. with Weather as of April 22nd, 2004 Figure 8
Blast Impact of a 550 Kt Surface Nuclear Detonation on Washington, D.C. with Weather as of April 22nd, 2004.International Journal of Health Geographics 2007, 6:5 http://www.ij-healthgeographics.com/content/6/1/5
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lent in rems. The RBE is a "quality factor," often denoted
by the letter Q, which assesses the damage to tissue caused
by a particular type and energy of radiation. For alpha par-
ticles, Q may be as high as 20, so that one rad of alpha
radiation is equivalent to 20 rem. The Q of neutron radia-
tion depends on their energy. However, for beta particles,
x-rays, and gamma rays, Q is taken as one, so that the rad
and rem are equivalent for those radiation sources
[61,62].
Blast Impact of a 550 Kt Surface Nuclear Detonation on Chicago with Weather as of March 19th, 2003 Figure 9
Blast Impact of a 550 Kt Surface Nuclear Detonation on Chicago with Weather as of March 19th, 2003.International Journal of Health Geographics 2007, 6:5 http://www.ij-healthgeographics.com/content/6/1/5
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Overall effects
The effects of thermal, blast and radiation for both 20 and
550 Kt events can be readily seen in figures 2a through 2f.
Blast and thermal effects can be compared for 20 and 550
Kt detonations in figures 2a and 2b, and 2c and 2d respec-
tively. All four of the figures are on the same scale. The fig-
ures readily bring out the relative importance of blast
compared to thermal for the smaller 20 Kt event (compare
figure 2(a) to 2(c)) and the much larger effects of thermal
with the larger 550 Kt event (compare figure 2(d) to 2(b).
The much greater relative size of the fallout plume for a
550 Kt compared to a 20 Kt event is easily seen in figures
2e and 2f, which are at the same scale.
Despite the smaller effect of thermal compared to blast for
the 20 Kt detonation, it must be emphasized that hospi-
tals have very few burn beds in the entire U.S.A. (< 1500)
and only a few (less than 150) are not occupied at any one
time. Even a small nuclear event will totally overwhelm
our hospitals' ability to take care of resulting burn casual-
ties.
Blast Impact of a 550 Kt Surface Nuclear Detonation on Atlanta with Weather as of April 23rd, 2004 Figure 10
Blast Impact of a 550 Kt Surface Nuclear Detonation on Atlanta with Weather as of April 23rd, 2004.International Journal of Health Geographics 2007, 6:5 http://www.ij-healthgeographics.com/content/6/1/5
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Thermal and Fallout Impacts of 550 Kt Surface Nuclear Detonation on New York City with Weather as of September 17th,  2004 Figure 11
Thermal and Fallout Impacts of 550 Kt Surface Nuclear Detonation on New York City with Weather as of September 17th, 
2004.International Journal of Health Geographics 2007, 6:5 http://www.ij-healthgeographics.com/content/6/1/5
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Thermal and Fallout Impacts of a 550 Kt Surface Nuclear Detonation on Washington, D.C. with Weather as of April 22nd, 2004 Figure 12
Thermal and Fallout Impacts of a 550 Kt Surface Nuclear Detonation on Washington, D.C. with Weather as of April 22nd, 
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Thermal and Fallout Impacts of a 550 Kt Surface Nuclear Detonation on Chicago with Weather as of March 19th, 2003 Figure 13
Thermal and Fallout Impacts of a 550 Kt Surface Nuclear Detonation on Chicago with Weather as of March 19th, 2003.International Journal of Health Geographics 2007, 6:5 http://www.ij-healthgeographics.com/content/6/1/5
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Thermal and Fallout Impacts of a 550 Kt Surface Nuclear Detonation on Atlanta with Weather as of April 23rd, 2004 Figure 14
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Thermal and Fallout Impacts of a 20 Kt Surface Nuclear Detonation on New York City with Weather as of August 8th, 2003 Figure 15
Thermal and Fallout Impacts of a 20 Kt Surface Nuclear Detonation on New York City with Weather as of August 8th, 2003.International Journal of Health Geographics 2007, 6:5 http://www.ij-healthgeographics.com/content/6/1/5
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Thermal and Fallout Impacts of a 20 Kt Surface Nuclear Detonation on Washington, D.C. with Weather as of April 22nd, 2004 Figure 16
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Thermal and Fallout Impacts of a 20 Kt Surface Nuclear Detonation on Chicago with Weather as of March 19th, 2003 Figure 17
Thermal and Fallout Impacts of a 20 Kt Surface Nuclear Detonation on Chicago with Weather as of March 19th, 2003.International Journal of Health Geographics 2007, 6:5 http://www.ij-healthgeographics.com/content/6/1/5
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Thermal and Fallout Impacts of a 20 Kt Surface Nuclear Detonation on Atlanta with Weather as of January 2nd, 2004 Figure 18
Thermal and Fallout Impacts of a 20 Kt Surface Nuclear Detonation on Atlanta with Weather as of January 2nd, 2004.International Journal of Health Geographics 2007, 6:5 http://www.ij-healthgeographics.com/content/6/1/5
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Effects of 20 Kt surface detonation
In the first 750 m (12psi) virtually all buildings will be
destroyed by blast, mass fires are common and prompt
radiation doses are fatal except in basements, resulting in
very few survivors. Between 750 and 1250 m the peak
overpressure decreases from 12 to 5psi with walls blown
out of buildings, though building frames may well sur-
vive. Debris will be tens of feet thick in most downtown
areas with ten-plus story buildings [45]. Roughly half of
the population in this area will be fatalities, mainly from
collapsing buildings, with the other half injured. Most of
those surviving will have been exposed to a fatal dose of
prompt radiation, though death will occur first due to
mass fires or third degree burns. Between 1250 m and
1750 m peak overpressures will fall from 5psi to near 3psi,
and burn thresholds towards the edge of this zone will
drop from third degree to second degree levels. Prompt
radiation also will typically drop quickly from over 800
rem at 1600 m to over 400 rem at 1700 m. At 1900 m or
3psi, large numbers of trauma injury would ensue from
walls blown out of steel framed buildings, severe residen-
tial damage and people caught in the open. By 2000 m,
burn risk will drop to first degree levels. At up to 3800 m
or 1 psi people will be endangered with flying glass and
debris from damaged structures and glass will break out to
over 6 kms, exposing those houses in the downwind fall-
out radiation zone to more radiation.
Effects of 550 Kt surface detonation
A 550 Kt detonation differs dramatically from a 20 Kt one
as the thermal effect increases dramatically in proportion
to blast effects. Thermal intensities of 25 cals/cm2 with
high mass fire probability reach out 4.7 kms or as far as
the 3.8 psi blast contour, while 13 cal/cm2 intensities
with many fires or even mass fires in some cities reach out
to 6.3 kms, roughly the same as the 2.5 psi blast contour.
In the first 1800 m peak overpressures will exceed 20psi,
destroying even the largest and best built structures. At
2200 m overpressures will be above 12 psi, destroying vir-
tually all but a very few specially constructed buildings.
The five psi contour extends out to 3,800 m, where the
walls of most buildings are blown out. Most or all of this
area will have very high prompt radiation values depend-
ing upon the bomb design. In addition the area will
almost certainly be consumed by fire as thermal fluences
exceed 25 cals/cm2 out to 4700 m. The high blast, high
radiation and high thermal combination means there will
be virtually no long-term survivors from these areas. High
thermal fluences continue out to beyond 6 kms (13 cal/
cm2) with overpressures of 2.5 psi. At 7 kms thermal flu-
ences still exceed 10 cals/cm2, associated with 2 psi over-
pressures. Some of those areas will experience fires, even
mass fires in some cities like Atlanta where there are many
frame houses within these contours. Secondary fires will
also start from damaged gas and power lines. Third degree
burns extend out to 7.3 kms with 2 psi overpressure
present, and second degree burns occur out to 8.7 kms
with overpressures exceeding 1.5 psi. Overpressures of 1
psi with first degree burns extend to almost 12 kms and
the 0.5 psi glass breakage extends out to almost 20 kms.
Populations affected by the detonations
Tables 2 and 3 show the affected populations in each of
the four cities for 550 and 20 Kt detonations. They are bro-
ken down into those affected by thermal, fallout radia-
tion, blast hazards and combined effects. The actual
percentage of the affected population in each group that
becomes a casualty depends on many factors, as well as
the interaction of the hazards.
Casualties from fallout
In the most extreme example of this effect in these simu-
lations, mortality rates from 90+% in Brooklyn extend
continually across the length of Long Island to 1% at the
eastern tip, with deaths due solely to radioactive fallout
(without thermal or blast injuries) from the 550 Kt deto-
nation in New York [Figure 11]. This could result in over
5,000,000 deaths in the > 90% plume area, which would
extend from Brooklyn to almost half the length of Long
Table 4: Effect of 550 Kt detonation on health care in four cities*
Affects of 550 Kt Detonation within 0.1% mortality contour and 1psi Washington New York Chicago Atlanta
Hospital Beds in Affected Area (in thousands) 9.9 24.5 12.1 4.5
Total Beds within 20/40 miles of incident edge (in thousands) 7.3/13.1 24.0/33.6 9.8/17.3 4.4/10.3
%Beds lost within 20/40 miles of incident edge 57/43 51/42 55/41 50/43
Number of Hospitals in Affected Areas 30 54 42 14
Additional Hospitals within 20/40 miles outside affected area 33/61 77/107 45/72 23/40
% Hospitals lost to incident 48/33 41/34 48/37 38/26
Number of Health Staff Affected by incident (in thousands) 67.1 145.3 75.1 28.8
Additional Health Staff within 20/40 miles (in thousands) 41.7/81.0 127.4/178.2 58.0/99. 8 25.8/35.2
% Health Staff Lost 62/45 53/45 56/43 53/45
• Effect contour was considered to be 0.1% mortality for radiation or 1 pound per square inch for blast, which would break windows and also 
subject staff to some burn effects when exposed to thermal radiation.International Journal of Health Geographics 2007, 6:5 http://www.ij-healthgeographics.com/content/6/1/5
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Island (the most populous half). As evaluated in the com-
bined injuries section, these numbers inevitably include
some thermal and blast initiated deaths.
An interesting pattern in these graduated mortality
plumes is that for the smaller 20 Kt detonation, the
number of victims in the 50–90% radioactive fallout
plumes is considerably less than in the 10–50% mortality
range plumes. For example, in the 20 Kt blast for New
York (Figure 15 and Table 3), for example, those mortality
numbers are 145,123 and 358,922, respectively, or an
approximate 1:2 ratio. This was also the case for the 20 Kt
Washington D.C.(Figure 16) and Chicago (Figure 17)
mortality plumes for radioactive fallout in the 50–90%
and 10–50% mortality ranges. For Atlanta (Figure 18), the
same pattern was also seen except the difference was even
higher at almost 1:4. This higher number of fatalities in
the areas with a lower percentage of mortality is due to the
smaller area covered by the 50–90% mortality plumes rel-
ative to the higher (90+%) and lower (10–50%) ranges
upwind and downwind. Apparently, the very high deposi-
tion rates of radioactive particles that occur in the first kil-
ometers from the detonation rapidly drops off in
magnitude with wind dispersion, with the broader areas
of dispersion at the lower concentrations of radioactivity
sufficient to account for remarkably higher rates of mor-
tality.
Combined injuries
The coincidence of the thermal and blast casualty areas
emanating from ground zero generates both a zone of
dual casualty categories as well as a greatly enhanced mor-
tality and morbidity rate for the geographically impacted
areas. Figures 2b and 2d show substantial areas affected by
both blast and thermal hazards. The casualty model pre-
dicts a zone of mass fires with > 25 cals cm2 for both sizes
of nuclear weapons detonations in these simulations. In
this area, the fireball generated by the blast, as well as
spontaneous incineration of buildings from radiant heat,
will generate mass fires that would consume the great
majority of the structures above ground. This quantity of
thermal energy would be expected to result in virtually
complete mortality from thermal injuries alone. For all
four cities, for a 550 Kt detonation the model generates a
nearly equivalent geographic area for this central > 25 cals
cm2 mass fire zone as it does for the blast ring incorporat-
ing trauma injuries resulting from up to 3 lbs/in2 blast
pressure. The central blast rings of 20 and 10 lbs/in2
would be expected to result in primarily complete mortal-
ity from the blast effects, like the total mortality resulting
from thermal effects in the > 25 cals cm2 thermal zone.
However, there would have been significant survival from
blast trauma effects in the 3 lbs/in2 blast ring were it not
for its coincidence with the > 25 cals cm2 thermal zone.
These people surviving blast trauma injury would suc-
cumb instead to death from the mass fires.
Overall, the total number of affected population by ther-
mal injuries is 30% greater than that for blast injuries for
all four cities for the 550 Kt detonation predictions (Table
2). Outside the mass fire areas, there will be geographic
areas dominated by either first, second, or third degree
burns in surviving victims of the nuclear detonation.
These three thermal injury category zones coincide
approximately with the 1 and 2 lbs/in2 blast ring areas in
all four cities for the 550 Kt detonation simulations (com-
pare Figures 3, 4, 5, 6 for thermal with Figures 7, 8, 9, 10
for blast). The total number of thermal injuries from the
2nd and 3rd degree burn areas is consistently smaller than
the trauma injuries in these geographically similar areas
for the 1–2 psi blast rings. For Washington, New York,
Chicago, and Atlanta (550 Kt simulations in Table 2),
these two burn areas together produce 73%, 75%, 72%,
and 71%, respectively, of the blast injuries from 1–2 psi
that occur in the same approximate area.
A comparison/contrast of blast, thermal and prompt radi-
ation effects is best made with the 20 Kt detonation, as the
dominance of thermal effects at the larger nuclear detona-
tions masks their associations. For a 20 Kt detonation
mass fires from 13 cals/cm2 thermal fluences would nor-
mally extend out to a location where blast effects at the
7psi level are also present. Blast effects alone at 7psi would
account for at least 10% fatalities with virtually all of the
rest injured due to catastrophic structural damage and
impaction or injuries from flying glass. Just 80 m closer to
ground zero, fatalities due to blast at 8psi would leap to
50%. Much of this zone would likely be consumed by
mass fires as it is within the 13 calorie/cm 2contour. It is
also well within the area of intense prompt radiation with
values well over 1000 rem; only those in well protected
basements or in subways would escape this prompt radi-
ation.
The third degree burn zone would extend out to where
blast intensities of just over 4psi were experienced, caus-
ing major structural damage to frame houses and lighter
commercial construction. In addition to burns, many
injuries will occur because of movement of interior walls
and objects, and impaction of humans, especially those
standing, on fixed items. In addition, prompt radiation of
over 1000 rem in the open will have affected the entire
area, greatly compounding the recovery process for those
experiencing good protection by buildings and causing
death to those exposed in the open or in many types of
buildings [[26], 1–10]. In this third degree burn zone,
15% of the affected population who are outside or near
line-of-sight windows will die because of second degree or
worse burns to their bodies followed by shock; anotherInternational Journal of Health Geographics 2007, 6:5 http://www.ij-healthgeographics.com/content/6/1/5
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40% will have buildings or walls fall on them and be
killed, trapped or injured with trauma events. At least 15%
will receive lethal prompt radiation doses and 10% will
die in the plume from exposure to very high levels of fall-
out radiation. Of the 20% left, about a third will have
received about 500 rem (assuming an average protection
factor of 0.5 for prompt neutrons) which will eventually
prove fatal in this environment. Another third will receive
about 300 rem, which will prove fatal for 5–10% of them
after 60 days. In the end, there may only be a 10% survival
rate in the third degree burn zone (1500 m)
As we move from the 1500 meter to the 2000 meter dis-
tance from ground zero, conditions for survival improve
rapidly. Peak overpressures decrease from 4 psi to just
over 2.5 psi and burn injuries decrease to first degree. Two
psi is reached at 2300 m and one psi at 3800 m. Prompt
radiation falls off precipitously between 1600 (1,000+
rem), 1700 (400 rem) and 2000 m (80 rem). Many of
those in the open will have been subject to fatal doses, but
those inside with reasonable protection factors should be
safe from prompt radiation in the outer parts of this zone.
Mortality and morbidity will remain high for those in the
fallout plume as these people will have been exposed to
very high levels of radiation, with some additional blast
and burn injury combinations.
Injuries from breaking glass will occur at over 6 kms,
where radiation in the fallout plume is 1800 rem. Most
injuries beyond 2000 m will occur due to people being
caught in the fallout plume where radiation exposures,
even with protection, remain in the fatal range (2400 rem
in the open at 3800 m)
Due to the combination of injury categories, death rates
can be exacerbated far beyond that expected for any one
of the injuries taken alone. Victims cannot move and
could be consumed by fire or are simply left to die due to
lack of resources. Others fall victim to poor sanitation due
to failure of the main power, water and waste facilities.
Lack of immediate (12 hours) or even intermediate (48
hours) health care often results in the body going into
shock or succumbing to infection, which would not have
occurred had basic health care been available.
Immediate deterioration of urban institutional health care 
resources
The nationwide trend of locating a majority of the major
urban health care institutions in downtown areas would
result in a staggering loss of the total institutional health
care delivery following nuclear weapon use. Data is
shown for the four example cities in Table 4, though we
have seen very similar results in the 20 largest U.S. urban
areas (data not shown).
The four cities in Table 4 show 50–56% loss of hospital
beds within a 20 mile radius of a 550 Kt detonation, and
a 41–43% loss of beds at a 40 mile radius from a down-
town ground zero. These results are strikingly similar in
view of the very different geographic and demographic
landscapes of these four cities. When considering the
actual number of hospitals lost, Washington D.C., New
York, and Chicago are similar in magnitude of the per-
centage of hospitals lost, between 41–48% within 20
miles, and 33–37% lost within 40 miles of the detona-
tion. Atlanta, which is the smallest city of the test sample,
had a smaller percentage of hospitals lost compared to the
others. Due to the pattern of having the larger hospitals in
the downtown area, Atlanta still had a similar percentage
of bed loss, even though the number of hospitals lost
overall was smaller.
A closer look at the New York map (Figure 11) shows that
the situation is much worse for Long Island residents as
half of the hospitals within 20 miles are either west of the
Hudson in New Jersey and inaccessible due to high radia-
tion levels and/or fires on Manhattan or only accessible by
water across Long Island Sound. The loss of critical tun-
nels and bridges from Manhattan and contamination of
boats along southern Long Island Sound would vastly
complicate the relief effort and medical response for Long
Island residents.
As emergency planners begin to understand the impor-
tance of providing surge capacity some ameliorating
events are occurring. In the State of Georgia, the Division
of Public Health has purchased 11,000 portable emer-
gency hospital beds which is an impressive increase of
almost 70% over existing bed capacity for the State. These
resources will be distributed around the State and, in an
emergency, could be moved closer to the disaster for
greater efficiency in treatment and as a means to increase
the capacity of surviving hospitals. This approach is now
being pursued by other states.
Obviously, the most important resource in medical
response are the trained health care personnel, and it is in
this area that the most dramatic impact of a nuclear deto-
nation is seen on overall health care response. Losing at
least half of your health care responders in the first minute
of the attack is all the more damaging because so many of
the thermal and trauma injuries require immediate care
and cannot wait for the time-consuming importation of
replacement medical workers.
Another issue deals with medical and credentialing
records. Currently many records are stored in inner city
areas and may be lost in an attack. Many hospital records
are not stored off site and patient and staff records could
be lost or made inaccessible. Much work needs to be doneInternational Journal of Health Geographics 2007, 6:5 http://www.ij-healthgeographics.com/content/6/1/5
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on supporting informatics to ensure overall post-event
success.
One very important finding in the loss of hospitals and
medical resources from urban nuclear attack is the poten-
tial for a relatively greater impact of thermal injuries ver-
sus blast effects as the magnitude of the nuclear device
increases. Comparison of Figures 3 and 7, representing
thermal and blast impacts, respectively, for a 550 Kt deto-
nation in New York, demonstrates that overall there is a
greater radius of impacted hospitals from thermal effects
than blast effects. This pattern is repeated for Washington
D.C. (Figures 4 &8), Chicago (Figures 5 &9), and Atlanta
(Figures 6 &10). The outer edges of effects for the blast
effects, with 1 or 2 psi, could be expected to impact the
hospitals in those areas certainly, by blowing out win-
dows, moving equipment around, and, in combination
with thermal effects, injuring 25–45% of the population.
However, the outer edge of the second degree burn zone
burns extends roughly to the 1.5 psi radius (5.4 miles)
and would severely impact personnel in any hospital in
direct line of sight to the explosion. First degree burn
effects extend out further (7 miles), roughly to the 1 psi
contour. Even if some attempt to restore the hospital
infrastructure was made, combined thermal, EMP and
blast injuries would make it unlikely that the personnel
would be able to function effectively, especially in a mass
casualty crisis.
Future directions for improvement in casualty models to 
expedite disaster response
One of the largest limiting factors of these models is that
they require one to model an event of a known size. Initial
data will be inadequate to estimate the size of the weapon
with any certainty. Is it a 5, 10, 20 Kt or larger event? As
more information becomes available, better estimates
may be made. The collection of relevant real time data
from field sensors would greatly improve early estimates
of the event size and event impact, enable the models to
be run iteratively, making their output more reliable with
time and greatly improve decision-making. To maximize
the efficacy of these models and their associated data-
bases, responders, from the emergency medical technician
on scene, all the way up to the incident commander, must
understand in general terms the capabilities and limita-
tions of our models. Accordingly, it would be necessary to
involve them in tabletop and field exercises involving the
use of models.
Improved calculation of thermal effects (including burns
and mass fires) and fallout estimates for dense multi-sto-
rey urban environments in major US cities require more
detailed databases. DTRA is already coordinating the cre-
ation of building databases for priority U.S. cities. Oak
Ridge National Laboratories is preparing a more accurate
LandScan USA database on a 90 meter grid with both day-
time and nighttime population estimates for future
release [63]. Detailed land use and tax parcel data and
building information (height, construction date and type,
number of stories, etc) are being acquired for several cities
and will help to further refine the models and test the sen-
sitivity of the casualty estimates to different variables. The
incorporation of numbers of people actually present in
downtown and in the suburbs during working hours will
improve our predictions immensely The addition of
detailed journey-to-work (origin-destination) data and
building-level population data from fire departments and
insurance risk assessments to estimate daytime popula-
tions in urban centers will make for better casualty plan-
ning and management
These increased capabilities allow detailed Geographic
Information Systems analyses of the impact of potential
mass fires, and, of first, second and third degree burns,
and fallout and blast from nuclear incidents. Analysis of
block group data allows the impact of skin color and age
to be taken into account for better estimating burn inten-
sity and fallout mortality. More detailed data on buildings
allow the use of better radiation protection factors, which
improves casualty estimations further. They also improve
life and death decision-making processes such as shelter-
in-place or flee. These additional data permit the interac-
tion of blast, thermal and fallout effects to be better mod-
eled and thus generate more robust estimates of different
types of potential mass casualties which, in turn, help us
plan better responses for casualty prioritization and treat-
ment, given the limited medical resources that will be
available in the first few days after an incident.
While preparing for the potential use of WMD within
areas that have not seen mass casualties previously (such
as the United States) is of critical importance, these
"upgrades" of emergency response capabilities will also
have important "peacetime" benefits. Geographic infor-
mation systems used in tracking releases of toxic chemical
and radioactive agents and mobilizing emergency
response resources to targeted areas would also be highly
useful in responding to tornado and flood disasters.
While we can continue to hope that large-scale mass casu-
alties from WMD attacks will remain high consequence,
low probability scenarios, it is mandatory that we invest
the appropriate physical and human resources to deal
with such a staggering prospect.
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